22 June 2009
16 June 2009
12 June 2009
Battle Du Jour...
11 June 2009
05 June 2009
01 June 2009
Hypocrisy...
14 May 2009
RPG? What RPG, I'm holding that for a friend...
From: American Forces Press Service
Sent: Thu 5/14/2009 11:39 AM
Subject: Combined Task Force Makes First Suspected Pirate Capture
Combined Task Force Makes First Suspected Pirate Capture
Thu, 14 May 2009 11:16:00 -0500
The South Korean destroyer ROKS Munmu the Great and guided missile cruiser USS Gettysburg responded to a distress call from the Egyptian-flagged motor vessel Amira, which reported being attacked about 75 nautical miles south of Mukalla, Yemen.Combined Task Force Makes First Suspected Pirate Capture
American Forces Press ServiceABOARD USS GETTYSBURG AT SEA, May 14, 2009 - Ships from Combined Task Force 151 prevented a piracy attack in the Gulf of Aden, which resulted in the apprehension of more than a dozen suspected pirates aboard an alleged "mothership" yesterday.
Several assault rifle rounds and a rocket-propelled grenade round struck the Amira, causing little or no damage. A rope was thrown from the skiff in an attempt to board, but the attempt failed and the suspected pirates abandoned their attack.
Gettysburg and Munmu the Great launched their embarked helicopters which flew immediately to Amira's location. During its flight, the SH-60B helicopter assigned to Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron Light 46 located a small boat suspected of serving as a pirate mothership.
A Gettysburg visit, board, search and seizure team boarded the boat along with members of U.S. Coast Guard Legal Detachment 409 and apprehended the suspected pirates after finding eight assault rifles, a rocket-propelled grenade launcher and a rocket-propelled grenade. All 17 of the passengers were brought on board Gettysburg for further questioning.
"This is another clear example of how coordination between the Combined Maritime Forces resulted in the successful disruption of pirate activity," said Royal Navy Commodore Tim Lowe, deputy commander of the Combined Maritime Forces. "It is imperative that all maritime forces continue to synchronize their efforts to deter and disrupt these unlawful and aggressive acts."
Gettysburg and Munmu the Great are operating in support of CTF 151, a multinational task force established to conduct counterpiracy operations under a mission-based mandate throughout the CMF area of responsibility to deter, disrupt and suppress piracy and secure freedom of navigation.
(From a Combined Maritime Forces news release.)Related Sites:
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/U.S. 5th Fleet/Combined Maritime Forces
Update your subscriptions, modify your password or e-mail address, or stop subscriptions at any time by clicking on your 'User Profile' page at https://service.govdelivery.com/service/user.html?code=USDOD. You will need to use your e-mail address to log in. If you have questions or problems with the subscription service, please e-mail support@govdelivery.com.
Have another inquiry? Visit the online FAQ at www.defenselink.mil/faq/comment.aspx for up-to-date information.
Get the help you, your family, and fellow servicemembers need, when you need it. Visit http://www.warriorcare.mil/ to learn more.
Check out the National Resource Directory at
http://www.nationalresourcedirectory.org/, a new web-based resource for wounded, ill and injured service members, veterans, their families, families of the fallen and those who support them from the Departments of Defense, Labor, and Veterans Affairs.This service is provided to you at no charge by U.S. Department of Defense. Visit us on the web at http://www.defenselink.mil/.
GovDelivery, Inc. sending on behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense · 408 St. Peter Street Suite 600 · St. Paul, MN 55102 · 1-800-439-1420
13 May 2009
Hey Washington DC, don't panic...
From: DoD Advisories
Sent: Wed 5/13/2009 11:20 AM
Subject: NORAD Flight Exercise Planned for Washington, D.C.
NORAD Flight Exercise Planned for Washington, D.C.
Wed, 13 May 2009 11:17:00 -0500
| ||
NORAD Flight Exercise Planned for Washington, D.C. |
U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
On the Web: http://www.defenselink.mil/Advisories/
Media Contact: +1 (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public Contact: http://www.defenselink.mil/faq/comment.html or +1 (703) 428-0711 +1
Update your subscriptions, modify your password or e-mail address, or stop subscriptions at any time on your User Profile Page. You will need to use your e-mail address to log in. If you have questions or problems with the subscription service, please e-mail support@govdelivery.com.
GovDelivery, Inc. sending on behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense · 408 St. Peter Street Suite 600 · St. Paul, MN 55102 · 1-800-439-1420
06 May 2009
Another one bites the skirt...
A lifetime ago I worked in early satellite radio. Not the current slick XM / Sirius hegemony we have today, but rather the content delivered via satellite to small stations (mainly AM) across the nation. The format was news/talk with some feature and sponsored programming. We hosted folks like Sonny Bloch, Gary Null, Jack Ellery, Chuck Harder, and others.
Suffice to say I quit when I discovered the network had been bought and was being run by Nazis.
True story.
Thus my fascination with the media was truly ignited. I note today, while perusing Ad Age, that one of my few favorite cable outlets is changing its “branding”. SciFi is becoming SyFy. With all reference to syphilis aside, the rebranding is the result of the niche channel’s success. The company, in a terse March 16, 2009 press release poses the usual reasons for making the switch. Most importantly to allow for unique, and enforceable, brand identity as well as a growth towards imagination based programming.
I suspect we will see a change from solid, science fiction / horror / fantasy programming to one more skewed and demographically focused towards females 25-54.
It already is touting more reality shows, Quantum Leap / X-files like programming in its cable guide glossy section in the May 4, Ad Age.
I guess I shouldn’t be surprised. It’s where the money is, and after all, not everyone like Lifetime, Oxygen and every other “niche” cable outlet.
05 May 2009
The Doctors Sheds its Last Vestige of Credibility...
CBS, in a desperate bid for ratings, on its medical equivalent to The View, The Doctors, is planning to put vaccine denialist Jenny McCarthy on its show. It will be interesting to see if any of the paid medical performers are willing to counter any of her non-science rhetoric.
The press release on the event is here. The show has been roundly criticized in serious medical circles and the show itself is as staged as any “reality” TV production. Each of the medical pundits wears a variety of lab coast, scrubs or standard “doctor casual” clothing. They all look great and present a beautiful multi-cultural front which continues to support their presumed godlike powers.
I think I will tune in to XM’s ReachMD, a serious channel with real topics on medicine and science.
27 April 2009
No friend of Frank...
My blog-friend, Boston Maggie , was invited to the Pentagon as part of a milblog team to talk about access with the respective service heads. I am disappointed to report that the response form the Navy was disappointing. She provides (below) some detail to her visit. The Navy presenter is ADM Frank Thorp, who is the Navy’s top PAO (public affairs officer) known as the CHINFO.
Let me be blunt, RDML Thorp blew it, almost as badly as he botched the initial interviews as an O6 regarding PFC Jessica Lynch's fate. I am continually amazed at how many flag and general officers seem to forget how important good PR is in today's world, even the small elements. You can bet that this meeting will be repeated across the net. Having been an individual to see first hand how a little news story can ruin well laid plans (Dixie Chicks), I am appalled at this officer's behavior. At the very least you represent the citizens of the nation (essentially his boss) and were due much more courtesy.
I am also disappointed in RDML Thorp as he has had a front row seat on many groups which have been analyzing the new paradigm for communication. In fact he sat on the Defense Science Board on this very topic in January of 2008. The recommendations from that board were to recognize the sea changes and take action now.
The amount of positive play that military affairs gets outside of the "trade" journals (Army / Air Force / Navy Times, etc.) is almost zero. What friendship does he expect to strike up with the perpetually anti-military NYT? The WSJ is more concerned about the impact of reduced military spending and could care less about insights generated by journalists like Bing West, Michael Yon and the like. And yet these are the very people who end up providing the feedstock for the main stream media.
The DoD and the Navy in particular do not get the new media. They almost had it during the
I had intended to reprint the whole of her e-mail story, but will await her publishing it on the web. Suffice to say, the cat’s out of the bag and hopefully RDML Thorp will take a moment and reflect on how easily impressions are made or broken in our new viral, global media world
Until the military recognizes that they must pay as much attention to the small stories as the big ones, we will continue to find short shrift via official channels.
23 April 2009
China Sea, China Do...
15 April 2009
How do you solve a problem like a pirate...
A poster commented that the Navy needs Q-ships to combat the threat of piracy, especially off the coast of Africa . This is an interesting idea. Q-ships, or camouflaged merchant / raiders, have been in use since man set sail on the sea in an organized fashion. We should recall that merchant ships were regularly armed up until the start of the 20th century, where after which the advancement in naval ordnance made their weapons ineffective.
Q-ships were somewhat effective in World War I, but largely useless in World War II. Whether an armed merchant ship would be a sufficient deterrent to pirates operating in small boats is a worthwhile discussion. How would a nation respond to armed vessels entering their ports? What type of armament would be employed to meet the minimum force required to protect these ships. Would the risk of capture of this armament pose a greater risk than its use? How would we train and qualify crews? Given the wide range of standards among flagged merchant vessels, these are important questions.
More importantly, we should look at the roots of piracy in these regions. Failed national structures allow the existence of pirate bases. Loose to nonexistent control in the 16th and 17th centuries permitted the rise of piracy to epic proportions and our subsequent romanticism of this criminal activity. It was not until pirate town and bases were destroyed or pacified that piracy began to wane.
Posted from Navy History
Q-Ships (Anti-submarine vessels disguised as merchant vessels)
Related Resources: List of Q-Ships with links to their histories
Adapted from: "Eastern Sea Frontier War Diary," October 1943, ch.2, "Queen Ships." pp.9-34. Modern Military Branch, National Archives and Records Administration,
Prologue: End of the Q-Ship Program
Origins of Q-Ships in World War I
Q-Ships in World War II
Sinking of USS Atik (AK-101) by German submarine U-123
Cruises of USS Asterion (AK-100)
Cruises of USS Eagle (AM-132)/USS Captor (PYC-40)
Cruises of USS Big Horn (AO-45)
USS Irene Forsyte (IX-93)
Selected Bibliography for Further Information
Prologue: End of the Q-Ship Program
In the early morning hours of October 4, 1943, a dispatch from the three-masted schooner Irene Forsyte [IX-93] reported that she was hove to in approximately 38-00 N, 66-00 W; that many leaks had developed during the course of a heavy storms that her pumps were just able to keep ahead of water. The message further stated that the condition might become serious if the heavy weather continued; for that reason, permission was requested to proceed to
On October 14, 1943; Cominch [
Origins of Q-Ships in World War I
There is nothing new or secret about the general principle of Q-ship operations. When the U-boats [German submarines] were at their worst in World War I, the British Admiralty approved and authorized the conversion of merchant vessels to heavily armed raiders which would have her guns disguised or concealed in such a way that the merchant vessels might serve as decoys which would encourage U-boats to attack them. Then, provided the disguised merchant vessel had been given sufficient buoyancy, so that one or two torpedoes would be unable to sink her, the disguise was to be thrown off, the guns brought to bear, the U-boat sunk. The entire effectiveness of the enterprise depended on the successful use of surprise, and once the U-boats were aware of the ruse, the chances of success were so greatly reduced that only a few ingenious Commanding Officers were able to conduct Q-ship campaigns throughout the remainder of World War I with any distinction.
Q-Ships in World War II
In World War II, the sudden appearance of U-boats in Atlantic coastal waters led to considerations of all possible means for meeting the emergency. Sinkings began on January 14th, and shipping losses mounted rapidly. On January 20, 1942, Cominch sent for information to Commander Eastern Sea Frontier a coded dispatch which was paraphrased as follows:
"Immediate consideration is requested as to the manning and fitting-out of Queen repeat Queen ships to be operated as an antisubmarine measure. This has been passed by hand to OpNav [Office of the Chief of Naval Operations] for action."
In answer, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier wrote a lengthy letter under the date of January 29th, pointing out that the most prevalent method of U-boat attack had been night attacks on the surface from close range; that U-boats were concentrating on tankers. For this reason it was pointed out that a tanker would best answer the purpose of inviting attack after having been fitted out as a Q-ship. It was further suggested that another type of Q-ship might be a vessel "of such a relatively insignificant appearance that upon sighting it a submarine would not submerge." This implied that a small schooner might serve the purpose.
This letter containing details as to procedure, was forwarded by Cominch to the Chief of Naval Operations on February 15, 1942, and CESF [Commander Easter Sea Frontier] was informed that the proposals had been "noted with interest" and were "under consideration." Five days later, on February 20, 1942, the Chief of Naval Operations informed Commander Eastern Sea Frontier that his proposals had been approved, that hereafter the matter would be known as "Project LQ"; that all communications on the matter would be made by word of mouth, insofar as practicable; that a responsible officer would be placed in charge of the work; that on completion, "Project LQ" would be assigned to the force of the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier.
Prior to the inception of "Project LQ," Cominch had arranged for the selection of three other vessels considered suitable for the intended purpose: a
The two cargo vessels had been built at
The complement of each ship was six officers and 135 enlisted men. Although these three vessels were regularly commissioned by the Commandant Navy Yard,
Some complicated problems of protocol were solved while the ships were still being converted. In order to preserve the highest possible degree of secrecy in operating the merchantmen and the beam trawler, $500,000 was allotted from an Emergency Fund so that expenditures would not be directly accountable through the General Accounting Office and the Treasury. On February 19, 1942, the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral H. S. Stark, USN) opened a joint account in the Riggs National Bank, Washington, D. C. in the name of F. J. Horne and/or W. S. Farber, and deposited the sun of $500,000, with the understanding that the Chief of Naval Operations might at times request transfer of funds from this account to other names. He then requested immediate transfer of the following sums to the following accounts:
| Eagle Fishing Company, L. F. Rogers, Master | $50,000 |
| Asterion Shipping Company, K. M. Beyer, Treasurer | $100,000 |
| Atik Shipping Company, E. T. Joyce, Treasurer | $100,000 |
Such an arrangement permitted the purchase of supplies for the individual ships involved without the customary naval requisition procedure.
After many other minor details had been ironed out, the next step was the arrangement for operational directives which might be foolproof. On March 11th, the Commanding Officers of USS Eagle, USS Asterion and USS Atik (Lieut. Comdr. L. F. Rogers, USNR, Lieut. Comdr. G. W. Legwen, USN, and Lieut. Comdr. Harry L. Hicks, USN, respectively) were given personal and written instructions at Headquarters, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier. They received a preliminary Operation Order to cover a brief period of shakedown, which would start about Match 24, 1942. Since they would be departing from
On completing shakedown, these ships were to report to Commander Eastern Sea Frontier by dispatch, and at that time the second Operation Plan would be made effective by dispatch from Commander Eastern Sea Frontier. This second Operation Plan, also issued under date of March 11, 1942, applied only to the Atik and the Asterion. Therein they were directed to operate independently in the waters off the
Atik: SS Vill
Asterion: SS Generalife, Spanish Registry, Call EAOQ
As for eventual return to port, instructions were given that notice should be sent to Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, who would inform Mr. Huntington Morse or Mr. S. F. Helmbold of the Maritime Commission at Washington, that one of these men should inform the senior Maritime Commission representative at the port of entry; that a Maritime Commission representative at the port would receive lists of requirements from the Commanding Officer after arrival and would designate an agent to furnish them; that the Commanding Officer should ascertain the total cost and should deliver a check for the amount...for the U. S. Maritime Commission.
From March 11th to March 23, 1942, final arrangements were made for the first sailing of these vessels on shakedown, They sailed at 1300 on March 23rd, and the next day one of the officers in the Navy Department wrote, "It's gone with the wind now and hoping for a windfall."
Sinking of USS Atik (AK-101) by German submarine U-123
Unfortunately, the windfall cane all too soon. Before the shakedown cruise was tour days old, USS Atik (SS Carolyn) was attacked and sunk by a U-boat. All bands were listed as "missing." The details of the battle are so sparse as to make any satisfactory reconstruction impossible. It is known that the Atik had been cruising in the general area about 300 miles east of
At 2053, radio stations at Manasquan, New Jersey, and at Fire Island, New York, intercepted the following distress message from SS Carolyn: "SSS SOS Lat. 36-00 N, Long. 70-00 W, Carolyn burning forward, not bad." Two minutes later, a second distress message from SS Carolyn further amplified: "Torpedo attack, burning forward; require assistance." The position indicated that the attack was taking place some 300 miles east by south from
The next piece of information came from
"The High Command said today that a Q-boat--a heavily armed ship disguised as an unarmed vessel--was among 13 vessels sunk off the American Atlantic coast and that it was sent to the bottom by a submarine only after a `bitter battle.' (In the last war, Q-boats accounted for many submarines which slipped up on them thinking they were easy prey. When the submarines came into range, false structures on the Q-boats were collapsed, revealing an array of guns.)"
"The Q-boat, the communiqué said, was of 3,000 tons and was sunk by a torpedo after a battle 'fought partly on the surface with artillery and partly beneath the water with bombs and torpedoes.'"
So far as
Cruises of USS Asterion (AK-100)
The first cruise of USS Asterion (alias SS Evelyn) began with the shakedown, and continued until April 18, 1942. The incidents of importance in that cruise were many, and they included several sound contacts with U-boats, the sighting of torpedoed merchant vessels and life boats, the rescue of survivors. Furthermore, several contacts with friendly surface craft and aircraft led to awkward situations which required tact and ingenuity on the part of the Commanding Officer. Nevertheless, the first cruise was concluded without any action against enemy submarines. A copy of the formal report of this first cruise, together with "Recommendations for reduction in merchant ship losses and operation of Q-ships" is included in the Appendix to this month's war diary. It is of interest to note that officers in Headquarters, ESF, were so completely unaware of the nature of this ship's mission that they recorded her various dispatches in the Enemy Action Diary for April 4th, April 10th and April 14th, under her commercial name, SS Evelyn.
The second cruise of USS Asterion began on May 4, 1942, in Accordance with CESF'S Operation Plan 5-42, wherein it was stated that the convoy system would be inaugurated between
The third cruise of USS Asterion began on June 7, 1942, and because of increased submarine activities in the Gulf of Mexico, the vessel proceeded from New York down the coast, passing through the Straits of Florida on June 11th and past Dry Tortugas on June 14th; thence through Yucatan Channel; then after reversing course proceeded to the Mississippi River Delta, thence on a westerly course toward Galveston. The cruise back over a slightly different course was uneventful, and USS Asterion arrived in
The fourth cruise of USS Asterion began on July 20, 1942, en route from
The fifth cruise of USS Asterion began late in August and was similar in plan to that of the fourth cruise. The vessel sailed to
For the next few months, USS Asterion was given an elaborate overhaul. Inspection after her sixth cruise raised considerable doubt as to her ability to remain afloat if hit by a single torpedo because she had three large holds. A representative of the Navy Yard,
On October 14, 1943, Cominch informed Commander Eastern Sea Frontier that USS Asterion would discontinue her previous duties; that she would be inspected by a Board of Inspection and Survey to determine "suitability for useful service" in some other capacity. USS Asterion was subsequently converted for use as a weather-vessel in the
Cruises of USS Eagle (AM-132)/USS Captor (PYC-40)
The various cruises of the beam trawler, MS Wave, commissioned USS Eagle (AM-132) were as unproductive in results as were those of USS Asterion. Her first cruise, carried out in accordance with CESF Operation Order 3-42 of March 11, 1942, was intended to permit her to operate independently as a Q-ship in the general vicinity of the beam trawler fishing fleet out of
A new operation plan, dated May 20, 1942, was drawn up for USS Captor by CESE, with the stipulation that the mission of patrol in the area of
Cruises of USS Big Horn (AO-45)
The most formidable of the Q-ships was the tanker SS Gulf Dawn, selected by Commander Eastern Sea Frontier after Cominch had approved his proposal for using a disguised tanker. Conversion was begun in March 1942 at the
The first cruise of USS Big Horn began on September 27, 1942, when the ship proceeded from
On October 16, 1942, the Big Horn sailed in convoy "T-19" from
A second cruise in company with a convoy from Trinidad was begun by USS Big Horn on November 1, 1942, to a point nearly due north of
On November 10, 1942, USS Big Horn sailed in convoy TAG-20, with the gunboat USS Erie [PG-50], two PC [submarine chaser] boats and a PG [patrol gunboat] acting as escorts. As a result of submarine warnings the convoy course was changed so that the approach to
It developed that the
On November 21, 1942, USS Big Horn proceeded from mooring in Curacao and joined a convoy bound for
On January 27, 1943, new proposals for antisubmarine operations by the Big Horn were submitted to the Chief of Staff , ESF, by three officers: Lieutenant Commander Farley, USN, (officer in charge of the ESF Q-ship project), Lieutenant Commander R. Parmenter (ASW officer) and Lieutenant Hess (Submarine Tracking Officer). Their proposal began by reviewing the fact that antisubmarine measures within ESF had been so successful that no vessels had been sunk in Frontier waters since July 1942; but that more and more enemy submarines were operating in different areas of the
On April 3, 1943, CESF informed Cinclant that the Big Horn and the three PC's would proceed to sea with convoy UGS-7A on April 13th, and that prior to arrival in the vicinity of the Azores the group would drop astern of the convoy and proceed as straggler-with-escorts, although the escorts would remain far enough astern so that they would not be visible to an enemy submarine sighting the Big Horn. Corroboration of this plan was made by Cominch in a letter to Cinclant dated April 7, 1943. Information as to the plan was then communicated by Cinclant to Commander Task Force 64, who was to act as Escort Commander for Convoy UGS-7A. The Task Group was designated 02.10, although it was understood that routine reports would be made via Cinclant during the time in which the Task Group was operating in Atlantic waters outside the waters of the Eastern Sea Frontier. In the organization of the Atlantic Fleet, this Task Group was designated TG 21.8, operating under ComDesDiv 21 [Commander, Destroyer Division Twenty One], riding the destroyer Livermore [DD-429].
Convoy UGS-7A sailed on the morning of April 14, 1943, and the special Task Group joined up off
Continuing on a homeward course, the Commanding Officer of the Big Horn attempted to use the Cominch daily submarine estimates as guides for fruitful changes of course, but after several attempts had failed to produce results, the Task Group Commander recorded in his log, on May 13, 1943, "This makes three submarines we have attempted to intercept on our return trip, all of which we theoretically should have met. This experience again accents the hopelessness of trying to find submarines. The proper procedure, as originally planned, is to remain in the vicinity of convoys, to which the submarines will come. On the next trip, it is planned to stay within about 15 miles, or less, of the convoy." The Task Group arrived at Ambrose on May 17, 1943.
The next period in the life of the Big Horn was spent in the Atlantic Basin Iron Works,
The final cruise of the Big Horn in the capacity of a Q-ship was also her longest, Again she served as the flagship of a small Task Group which included only two other vessels: PC-618 and PC-617. In the organization of the Atlantic Fleet, this unit was designated Task Group 21.8, scheduled to sail in convoy UGS-13 from
On October 14th, Cominch directed that USS Big Horn should be retained in active service but that no alterations or extensive repairs should be made without specific authorization of Cominch.
One more uneventful cruise was made by the Big Horn in company with PC-617 and PC-618, following training exercises in the
In summarizing this cruise, the Commanding. Officer of the Big Horn wrote, "It may be noted that during the period from 27 November to 1 December, this Task Group was in the midst of a group of from 10 to 15 U-boats. Nine contacts, sightings or attacks on U-boats took place in our immediate vicinity, so that it is most unlikely that we were not seen by some U-boats. Evidently the U-boats are wary of attacking an independent tanker. If the Q-ship program has contributed to this wariness, as is suggested in several prisoner-of-war statements, many independent merchant ships may thereby have escaped attack, and the Q-ship program has thus been of value."
Apparently Cominch did not agree with such a conclusion, for subsequent orders were that the Big Horn should join the Asterion in the new assignment to North Atlantic Weather Patrol Duty in the
USS Irene Forsyte (IX-93)
The fifth vessel to be converted as a Q-ship was the three-masted schooner USS Irene Forsyte mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The original proposal for using such a vessel as a Q-ship was made by Lieutenant Commander R. Parmenter, the ASW [Anti Submarine Warfare] Officer previously mentioned. On September 30, 1942, his suggestions were submitted to CESF by the officer in charge of ESF Q-ships, Commander L. C. Farley, who suggested that a three-masted schooner could be picked up for about $12,000; that if such a plan were approved it was recommended that the Commanding Officer of the vessel should be Lieut. Comdr. Parmenter. The plan was submitted to Cominch by Commander Eastern Sea Frontier in a letter dated October 9, 1942, and was approved. Within two weeks, CESF recommended the purchase of a Canadian schooner named Irene Myrtle, which was owned by T. Antle in
The original plan was for using the vessel off the "
On the first leg of this cruise, the Irene Forsyte ran into heavy weather which opened up her seams and caused such serious leakage that there was temporary fear that the vessel would founder before she could put in at Bermuda. Immediately questions were raised as to why the vessel had been permitted to go to sea in such obviously unseaworthy condition. The upshot of the matter was the appointment of a Board of Investigation to ascertain responsibility for materiel failure of the vessel. In commenting on the report of the Naval Inspector General, Cominch wrote as follows:
"The conversion of USS Irene Forsyte is an instance of misguided conception and misdirected zeal, which, coupled with inefficiency resulting from lack of supervision by competent authority; has cost the government nearly half a million dollars in money and a serious waste of effort. In addition, much valuable material that can ultimately be used has been frozen for the better part of one year. The facts and circumstances responsible therefor are set forth in detail in the enclosures.
"I recognize that the actions of the officers were, in general, motivated by a desire to assist in the war effort. However, it appears to be a fact that some of the officers concerned took advantage of the broad authority that was granted in the interests of secrecy to obtain equipment that did not contribute to the military value of the vessel. Furthermore, the failure to ascertain, prior to or during conversion, that the vessel was unseaworthy is an indication of professional incompetence on the part of the officers concerned. The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontiers and the Commandant, Third Naval District after such further investigation as they may deem necessary, will take appropriate corrective and disciplinary action. Disposal of the vessel has been provided for in other correspondence.
"The practice of granting to Frontier Commanders and District Commandants uncontrolled authority to implement projects of this nature has been discontinued."
Thus ended the use of Q-ships in the Eastern Sea Frontier during World War II.
Selected Bibliography For further information:
Beyer, Kenneth M. Q Ships Versus U-Boats:
Blair, Clay. Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunters, 1939-1942.
Chatterton, E. Keble. Q Ships and Their Story.
Farago, Ladislas. The Tenth Fleet.
Gannon, Michael. Operation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of
Grenfell, E.W. "Discussions, Comments, Notes: A Japanese Q-Ship." US Naval Institute Proceedings 79, no.8 (Aug. 1953): 899-900. [1942 incident involving USS Gudgeon (SS-211) and an armed Japanese steamer].
McElroy, John W. "Discussions, Comments, Notes: The Loss of an American Q-Ship in World War II." US Naval Institute Proceedings 81, no.2 (Feb. 1953): 215. [loss of USS Atik].
Morison, Samuel Eliot. The
Sanderson, James Dean. Giants in War.
Smith, Richard W. The Q-Ship - Cause and Effect. US Naval Institute Proceedings 79, no.5 (May 1953): 532-541. [Q-Ships in World War I].
29 June 2001